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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SEARCH WARRANTS - THE TOTALITY
OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST FOR DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE
CAUSE IS ADOPTED. Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350
(1983).
Dr. Robert Thompson was convicted of twenty separate offenses of
carnal abuse in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County.' His appeal to the
Arkansas Supreme Court was based in part on a contention that the
trial court erred in holding an affidavit sufficient to support issuance of
a search warrant. The affidavit was based on an anonymous informant's
tip. The affidavit contained correct information as to Thompson's pro-
fession, place of employment, and residence; a description of the victim
and his father;' and the informant's admission to engaging in sodomy
with Thompson, an admission against interest which would subject the
informant to criminal liability.3 The informant also had a key to the
residence, given to him by Thompson, and he drew a detailed sketch of
the residence.
Thompson challenged the sufficiency of the affidavit on fourth
amendment grounds, contending it did not meet the requirements of
the two-prong test set out in Aguilar v. Texas4 and codified in the Ar-
kansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.5 The Aguilar test requires that an
affidavit based on an informant's tip first establish the basis of the in-
I. Thompson was sentenced to the statutory maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment
and a $10,000 fine for each count, to run consecutively.
2. The informant also made a positive identification of the victim's father from a photo-
graphic spread.
3. Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 265, 270, 658 S.W.2d 350, 352.
4. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
5. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 13.1(b) provides:
The application for a search warrant shall describe with particularity the persons or
places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized, and shall be supported by
one (I) or more affidavits or recorded testimony under oath before a judicial officer
particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that such persons
or things are in the places, or the things are in possession of the person, to be searched.
If an affidavit or testimony is based in whole or in part on hearsay, the affiant or wit-
ness shall set forth particular facts bearing on the informant's reliability and shall dis-
close, as far as practicable, the means by which the information was obtained.
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formant's knowledge.' The magistrate must be able to determine the
facts and circumstances that lead the informant to his conclusion. Sec-
ond, the affidavit must demonstrate that the informant is credible or his
information reliable. 7 The court held that the affidavit was sufficient
under the two-prong test, but further stated that the proper test in fu-
ture cases would be the totality of the circumstances test announced by
the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates.8 Thompson v.
State, 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350 (1983).
The fourth amendment9 originated as a response to the wide-
spread use and abuse of general warrants in England.10 A broad search
and seizure power was first exercised in England as a means to enforce
governmental restrictions on freedom of the press." All publications in
England were required to be licensed by the Crown."2 To enforce this
requirement, an almost unlimited power to search and seize unlicensed
materials was conferred upon law enforcement officials.' 3 However, as
a response to this indiscriminate power of search and seizure, the com-
mon law formulated a body of rules restricting the right to search, seize
and arrest.' 4 These rules applied to everyday crimes, rather than to
violations of licensing rules. Lord Coke went so far as to declare that
the common law could not confer upon anyone the power to search a
man's home, while Sir Matthew Hale took a more conservative view.
According to Hale's theory, warrants were valid only if specific and
based on probable cause.'
It was not until 1763, however, that the common-law courts
handed down a decision that expressly condemned the use of general
warrants and allowed a recovery of damages by one whose home had
been wrongfully searched pursuant to a general warrant.' 6 This was
soon followed by Entick v. Carrington,17 a famous decision which con-
6. Aguilar. 378 U.S. at 114-15.
7. Id.
8. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
10. J. LANDYNSKI. SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19-20 (1966).
II. Id. at 21.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 20-22. This expansive power continued from approximately 1538 until approxi-
mately 1694. Id. at 21.
14. See id. at 26.
15. Id. at 26-27.
16. Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153 (C.P. 1763).
17. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (C.P. 1765).
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demned the use of general search warrants except when executed for
the search of stolen goods or contraband. 18 This decision is notable not
only for its condemnation of the general warrant, but also for the fact
that it made no exception for a general search made pursuant to the
investigation of a serious crime. 9
This abusive search and seizure power found its way across the
Atlantic to the American colonies in an attempt to enforce English
laws requiring that a duty be paid on imported goods. Because of the
prevalence of smuggling in the colonies, the Crown authorized the use
of writs of assistance in an attempt to enforce payment of the duties.2 0
These writs were general warrants which vested the holder with an un-
limited and discretionary power to search and seize. 2' The fourth
amendment addressed itself to the abuse of these writs.22 The Framers
intended to prevent this abuse by requiring that all searches and/or
seizures be reasonable and that all search warrants be specific and
based on probable cause.23
Early in the history of the new nation, the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of what is required for a valid search war-
rant.2 4 In an opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court re-
quired that a warrant allege that a suspect is guilty of a particular
offense. It is not sufficient to state facts that do not constitute an
offense.2 5
The Court later defined "probable cause" and set out its require-
ments.2 "[T]he term 'probable cause,' according to its usual accepta-
tion, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation; and,
in all cases of seizure [and presumably search as well], has a fixed and
well known meaning. It imports a seizure made under circumstances
which warrant suspicion. ' ' 27 The often cited and best known judicial
definition of probable cause was stated in Stacey v. Emery:28 "If the
facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man
of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been commit-
18. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 10, at 54-55.
19. See id. at 55.
20. Id. at 30. Writs of assistance first appeared in England sometime during the reign of
James I. Id. at 22.
21. Id. at 31.
22. See generally LANDYNSKI, supra note 10, at 37-42.
23. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
24. Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806).
25. Id. at 452.
26. Stacey.v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
27. Locke v. United States, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813).
28. 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
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ted, it is sufficient." 29
It was not until 1886, in Boyd v. United States, 30 that the Su-
preme Court interpreted the language of the fourth amendment itself.
The holding in Boyd was based on an extensive analysis of Entick v.
Carrington.1 Justice Bradley, who delivered the opinion, stated that
the Framers undoubtedly relied on Lord Camden's opinion "as expres-
sing the true doctrine on the subject of searches and seizures, and as
furnishing the true criteria of the reasonable and 'unreasonable' char-
acter of such seizure .. ." The principles surrounding the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures apply to any and all
invasions by the government that affect the sanctities of a man's home
and his privacies of life. 33 A search is then unreasonable if it invades
"his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private
property. . . -34 The Court held that the fourth amendment rights ap-
plied in criminal cases, but "criminal" was given a rather broad inter-
pretation as any offense that might result in a forfeiture of a man's
property. 5
The next wealth of decisions concerning probable cause36 stemmed
from alleged violations of the National Prohibition Act.37 In Carroll v.
United States,3 8 probable cause was established by certain facts and
circumstances within the knowledge of the law enforcement officials,
including the actions, conduct, and place of residence of the
defendants. 9
29. Id. at 645.
30. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
31. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
32. 116 U.S. at 630.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 633-34. The Boyd decision had another notable aspect. It married the fourth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures to the fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination. The court held that the fourth amendment privilege was enacted to
prevent compulsory self-incrimination. Id. at 633. Justice Miller wrote a concurring opinion,
joined by the Chief Justice, in which he stated that "search" should be confined to its traditional
meaning and that the privileges protected by the two amendments should be kept separate and
distinct. 116 U.S. at 640-41. Although Justice Bradley's opinion remains a landmark decision in
search and seizure law as well as constitutional interpretation, the fourth and fifth amendments
have since become recognized as separate and distinct. See generally LANDYNSKI, supra note 10
at 55-60.
36. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Dumbra v. United States, 268
U.S. 435 (1925).
37. National Prohibition Act, Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305, (1919) (repealed 1935).
38. 267 U.S. 132. (This was a warrantless search, therefore no affidavit was involved. The
test for probable cause remains the same, however.).
39. Id. at 160-61.
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A statement of facts in an affidavit based on the affiant's personal
knowledge was held sufficient in Dumbra v. United States.4 The Court
stated that there is sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant if
an affidavit sets out sufficient evidentiary facts that justify a belief that
a particular offense is being committed at a particular place.41
Sufficient evidentiary facts were defined as those facts that present
enough evidence to allow the magistrate to draw his own legal conclu-
sion as to the presence or absence of probable cause. 2 Unless the mag-
istrate makes an independent determination, he is not functioning as an
intermediary between the state and the accused."3 If a magistrate
merely accepts a legal conclusion from the law enforcement official, he
is not making a legal determination, and the warrant will fail." This
requirement is to prevent a magistrate from becoming a "rubber
stamp" for the police, thus negating his true function.'
Probable cause is not guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore,
facts which establish probable cause need not be admissible at trial.4
"[P]robable cause, however, as the very name implies, .. .deal [s]
with probabilities."' 7
Neither may probable cause be evaluated by the success or failure
of the search.48 The inquiry must be focused on the situation as it ap-
peared at the time the warrant was issued.49 In other words, the judge
should not let hindsight color his findings; if there is no probable cause
to issue a warrant, the warrant is not validated because the illegal
search was successful."
The determination of probable cause based on the affiant's per-
sonal knowledge and observations presented relatively simple cases for
the Court. An affidavit was sufficient if it set out sufficient facts in
order to allow the magistrate to draw his own conclusions. 1 The diffi-
40. 268 U.S. 435.
41. Id. at 441.
42. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 41-47 (1933); See also United States v. Ven-
tresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1965).
43. Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 109.
44. Id. at 108-09.
45. Id. at 109.
46. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1949). See also Henry v. United
States, 361 U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (citing Brinegar).
47. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175.
48. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927). "A search prosecuted in violation of the
Constitution is not made lawful by what it brings to light .. " Id. at 29. See also United States
v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948); Henry, 361 U.S. at 103.
49. See Dumbra, 268 U.S. at 441.
50. Byars, 273 U.S. at 29. See also cases cited supra in note 48.
51. See. e.g., Carroll, 267 U.S. at 162. See also Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 170-71 (citing Carroll
6491984]
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culty began when law enforcement officials wished to establish probable
cause based on an informant's tip. Courts were faced with the difficult
task of reconciling competing interests. Courts must protect citizens
from unfounded and unreasonable invasions of their privacy, based on
mere suspicion. At the same time, they must allow fair leeway for en-
forcing the law. 52
Because the informant who remains anonymous is more greatly
removed from judicial safeguards, the United States Supreme Court
was faced with a new twist to an old problem. The Court first imposed
rather strict standards and held that an informant's tip could not alone,
without sufficient corroboration, establish probable cause. 53 Later, the
Court relaxed this standard somewhat in Draper v. United States.54 An
informant's tip in Draper contained detailed information as to the
physical description of the suspect. These neutral details were person-
ally verified by the law enforcement agents prior to any fourth amend-
ment activity. 55 Thus, an informant's tip could establish probable cause
if personally verified by law enforcement officials before the search or
seizure occurred.
In Giordenello v. United States,56 the Court addressed the issue as
to whether an informant's tip alone could establish probable cause.
While recognizing the problem with establishing probable cause based
solely on an informant's tip, the Court decided the case on non-consti-
tutional grounds and invalidated the warrant pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than the fourth amendment. It did
provide, however, a foreshadowing of things to come.
In Jones v. United States,57 one year after Draper, the Court held
that hearsay could establish probable cause.58 The informant in Jones
remained anonymous, but the information was sufficiently corroborated
by the officer's sworn statement accepting the basis for the informant's
story. The informant had given correct information in the past. Thus,
with approval); Nathanson, 290 U.S. at 47 (an affidavit must set forth those facts underlying
probable cause to allow a judicial determination).
52. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176.
53. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948). In this case, an informant's tip that
the defendant was using narcotics did not justify a warrantless search although the officers de-
tected the smell of narcotics. The Court held that the smell could not establish probable cause
unless a magistrate finds, through testimony, that the affiant is qualified to know the odor and that
it is distinctive.
54. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
55. Id. at 313. The informant had given reliable information in the past. Id.
56. 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
57. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
58. Id. at 271.
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due to the reliability of the informant, the officer did not need to make
any personal inquiry into the information so long as there was a "sub-
stantial basis for crediting the hearsay." 59
It was this "substantial basis" requirement that led the Court to
first formulate some sort of test that could be applied to those situa-
tions where probable cause was to be based on an anonymous tip. Early
decisions defined probable cause as a non-technical, flexible concept
that dealt with probabilities rather than certainties.60 Nonetheless, in
Aguilar"1 the Court imposed stricter requirements when probable cause
was based totally on information given the police in an anonymous tip.
These stricter standards were needed to lessen the chances that
searches and seizures would be made on mere suspicion.62 Citing
Rugendorf v. United States,63 the Court concluded that the affidavit in
Aguilar did not adequately set out evidentiary facts that would allow
the magistrate to draw his own conclusion, therefore there was not a
substantial basis for crediting the tip. 4 Because the magistrate could
not independently assess the evidence that led to the informant's con-
clusion, the affidavit could have been based solely on the informant's
suspicions. Without full probable cause, the search was invalid. 6
The Court held that the magistrate must analyze two separate ar-
eas. He must first be informed of the underlying circumstances on
which the informant relied to assure him that the informant's tip was
adequately supported by facts that constituted probable cause. This
analysis satisfied the "basis of knowledge" prong. The magistrate must
then analyze the facts and circumstances which led the affiant to con-
clude that the informant was reliable or his information was credible.
This analysis formed the veracity prong. 66 To satisfy the two-prong
test, the affidavit must set out evidentiary facts relied on by the inform-
ant as well as information that supported the tip's reliability or the
informant's credibility.
The next year, the Court arguably retreated from Aguilar by
mandating that warrants be assessed in a common sense, rather than a
59. Id. at 272. See also Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964) (citing Jones with
approval, the Court held that an anonymous informant's tip could establish probable cause); See
also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
60. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175; Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102; Stacey, 97 U.S. 642.
61. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
62. Id. at 114-15.
63. 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
64. 378 U.S. at 113-15.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 114-15.
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hypertechnical, manner.67 Any doubts caused by prior inconsistent
holdings were dissipated by Spinelli v. United States.6 8 The Court re-
lied extensively on the Aguilar test, and clarified the requirements. The
tip in Spinelli was from an anonymous but previously reliable inform-
ant. However, although it was partially corroborated, the corroboration
was not sufficient to establish probable cause. The affidavit contained
no information as to what led to the legal conclusion nor did it contain
facts that demonstrated the informant's credibility or reliability.69 The
tip was first analyzed under the Aguilar test to determine its probative
value. If the tip itself was inadequate to establish probable cause, then
the focus must be on the corroboration. If independent corroboration
was necessary, the tip must be found equally as trustworthy without
the corroboration. In short, the magistrate must be assured that the tip
is supported by facts that lead to probable cause.7 °
After the tip itself was substantiated, the focus then turned to the
informant. The magistrate must be assured that the information is reli-
able or that the informant is credible. The Spinelli Court felt that this
prong was perhaps more important; it must be satisfied in order for the
magistrate to be assured that there is indeed probable cause rather
than casual rumor. 71 The affidavit must set out facts that demonstrate
first the processes that led to the informant's conclusion and second, the
veracity of the information.
The tip in Spinelli failed to satisfy the Aguilar test because the
affidavit did not set out facts that established the veracity of the infor-
mation, but merely alleged that the anonymous informant knew
Spinelli was engaged in illegal gambling.72 Although the tip was par-
tially corroborated, those aspects essential to a finding of probable
cause remained uncorroborated. Thus, the tip itself was largely
uncorroborated.
Spinelli expressly rejected the totality of the circumstances test
when probable cause is to be determined by an anonymous tip.73 The
Court stated that when the tip is a necessary element of probable
67. Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 109. The Court recognized that the circumstances were suffi-
ciently detailed and the reason for crediting the source was given, but maintained that the warrant
should be interpreted in a common sense manner.
68. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
69. Id. at 414-16.
70. Id.
71. id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 415.
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cause, thetip must be precisely analyzed.7 4 In other words, just as an
affidavit based on the affiant's personal observations can be scrutinized,
an affidavit based on an anonymous tip must give the magistrate
enough information to scrutinize the tip equally as precisely as he
would an affiant's personal observations.
The Aguilar/Spinelli test was applied by the Court throughout
the 1970's and was used as a measuring stick for determining the valid-
ity of warrants. 75 United States v. Cortez78 was the first real indication
of a change in the Aguilar/Spinelli test. Cortez applied to border pa-
trol situations, and did not concern probable cause based on an anony-
mous tip, but nonetheless evidenced a trend toward a more flexible test
for probable cause. The Court stated that probable cause involved an
assessment of the whole picture based on all circumstances. 7
In Illinois v. Gates,78 the Court merged the independent prongs of
Aguilar/Spinelli into one totality of the circumstances test. The Court
felt this merger was necessary to facilitate judicial findings of probable
cause. 79 The informant's tip in Gates contained extensive information
as to the modus operandi used by the defendants to buy and sell illegal
narcotics. An agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration partially
corroborated the tip by conducting a surveillance of the defendants.
The agents personally observed the defendants conduct themselves ac-
cording to the information supplied by the informant. However, be-
cause the informant was anonymous, the tip would not be sufficient
under the Aguilar/Spinelli test, as the affidavit could not allege facts
that would satisfy the veracity prong.
Under the Aguilar test, courts were forced to apply an elaborate
set of rules that often invalidated search warrants without just cause.
The Court noted that "basis of knowledge" and "veracity/reliability"
remained highly relevant. However, the independent prongs should be
merged into one, so that deficiency in one would not preclude a finding
of probable cause if the other "prong" were fully satisfied. This view,
according to the Court, was more consistent with the earlier decisions
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Whiteley v. Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560 (1971);
United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (plurality opinion). An informant's self-incriminat-
ing statement was sufficient to satisfy the reliability/credibility prong of the Aguilar test. 403
U.S. at 583-84. The Court noted that the Aguilar test was not consistent with the Ventresca
common sense test of probable cause determination. 403 U.S. at 577.
76. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
77. Id. at 418.
78. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
79. Id. at 2333.
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defining probable cause."
The Court abandoned the strictures of the two-prong test in an
attempt to accommodate public and private interests in enforcing the
law. 81 The Court re-affirmed earlier decisions that held legal conclu-
sions insufficient. 82 In addition, the Court emphasized a need for magis-
trates to be able to find probable cause from an unknown informant's
tip.83 Under the Aguilar/Spinelli test, the veracity of these persons
could rarely, if ever, be determined, yet they often supply valuable in-
formation that leads to solving crimes.8' An assessment of probable
cause must contain a place for the anonymous informant.8 5
The fourth amendment is binding on the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 It follows then that the
states must offer their citizens at least that protection accorded them
by the federal government.87 Thus, Arkansas recognizes the same legal
limitations on the issuance of warrants, namely that the supporting affi-
davits set out sufficient evidentiary facts.88 Arkansas also allows anony-
mous information to be the basis for a warrant.8 '
The Aguilar test is codified in the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
Procedure as the proper method for determining probable cause.9"
However, Arkansas has been far from consistent in its application of
the Aguilar/Spinelli test. The court has, upon occasion, strictly ad-
hered to the two-prong test and required that search warrants ade-
quately demonstrate sufficiency under both prongs.91 At other times,
the court has attempted to apply a common sense Ventresca standard
80. Id. at 2332 (citing Brinegar and Ventresca with approval, the Court stated that probable
cause is a flexible concept).
81. Id. at 2331.
82. Id. at 2332.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Lunsford v. State, 262 Ark. 1, 552 S.W.2d 646 (1977); Montgomery v. State,
251 Ark. 645, 473 S.W.2d 885 (1971); Walton v. State, 245 Ark. 84, 431 S.W.2d 462 (1968) (an
affidavit must set forth evidentiary facts rather than legal conclusions); accord Cockrell v. State,
256 Ark. 19, 505 S.W.2d 204 (1974); Durham v. State, 251 Ark. 164, 471 S.W.2d 527 (1971).
89. See, e.g., Flaherty v. State, 255 Ark. 187, 500 S.W.2d 87 (1973); Walton, 245 Ark. 84,
431 S.W.2d 462 (1968); Glover v. State, 248 Ark. 1260, 455 S.W.2d 670 (1970). The court
refused to extend Walton, holding that limits are dictated by common sense.
90. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 13.1(b). See supra note 5.
91. See. e.g., Little Rock Police Dep't ex rel. Munson v. One 1977 Lincoln Continental Mark
V, 265 Ark. 512, 580 S.W.2d 451 (1979); Byars v. State, 259 Ark. 158, 533 S.W.2d 175 (1976);
Maxwell v. State, 259 Ark. 86, 531 S.W.2d 468 (1976).
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while attempting to follow the more rigid Aguilar/Spinelli test.92 In
State v. Lechner,93 the affidavit merely stated that the informant had
given reliable information in the past, without asserting any facts that
would allow the magistrate to draw his own conclusion. The court took
notice of the conflicts between the two-prong test and the non-technical
standard. The court stated that the two-prong test was effective in
preventing abuse of anonymous tips, as it assures that the informant
supplies probable cause and not mere rumor.94 However, the court
noted that this rigidity was also a drawback, especially if the informant
had never given information to the officials in the past.9" The court
concluded by applying the Aguilar test, tempered with common
sense.96 Lechner stated what would satisfy each prong. The "basis of
knowledge" prong could be satisfied by the informant's statement that
he personally observed illegal activity, or by independent corroboration
by law enforcement officials. The "reliability/credibility" prong could
be satisfied by a statement demonstrating the past reliability of the in-
formant, or by an informant's self-incriminating statement. But it is
often difficult to establish the reliability of an unknown, law-abiding
informant.9"
The most recent and perhaps strongest statement of the court's
approval of the Aguilar test was in State v. Prue.98 The affidavit was
invalidated due to a lack of sufficient evidence that established the in-
formant's reliability. Again, the affidavit contained nothing to establish
the veracity of the informant. The court noted the citizens were appar-
ently content with the Aguilar test and the protection it afforded them
against unreasonable searches.9 9 Thus, the court stated that probable
cause based on anonymous information should be strictly scrutinized. 100
If searches were allowed on unfounded hearsay, fourth amendment
safeguards would soon come to an end." 1
92. See Baxter v. State, 262 Ark. 303, 556 S.W.2d 428 (1977) (court cited the Aguilar test
as the proper standard, but stated that the practical, non-technical approach is the better rule);
Cary v. State, 259 Ark. 510, 534 S.W.2d 230 (1976) (court cited Spinelli but urged a non-
technical reading of affidavits).
93. 262 Ark. 401, 557 S.W.2d 195 (1977).
94. Id. at 405, 557 S.W.2d at 197.
95. Id. at 405, 557 S.W.2d at 198.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 272 Ark. 221, 614 S.W.2d 221, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863 (1981) (impliedly overruled
by Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350 (1983)).
99. 272 Ark. at 228-29, 614 S.W.2d at 225.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 229, 614 S.W.2d at 225.
19841 655
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The court in Thompson"'2 impliedly overruled Prue by replacing
the Aguilar test with the more flexible totality test, announced by the
United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates.0 3 The totality test
allows the magistrate to take a practical, common sense approach to
the determination of probable cause based on anonymous information,
by considering all relevant circumstances. The two-prong test required
that each affidavit be analyzed on two separate and independent
"prongs"-the informant's basis of knowledge (the facts that led him/
her to reach the conclusion) and the informant's reliability/credibility.
The Court held that the affidavit in Thompson would be sufficient
under Aguilar, yet further stated that the totality test would be applied
in the future, as it is more flexible.' 04
Justice Purtle concurred in the judgment but disagreed with the
majority's application of the Gates decision. 05 Because the tip was suf-
ficient under Aguilar/Spinelli, the majority's inclusion of Gates was
inappropriate. 06 In Gates, there was extensive independent and neutral
corroboration which supplied the probable cause. 10 7 The tip was merely
the starting point for the investigation.0 8 The informant's reliability/
credibility remained highly relevant. By adopting Gates, as it was read
by the majority, Justice Purtle charged that the fourth amendment was
in danger of gradual destruction by decisions made due to the social
outcry for harsher penalties for criminals rather than decisions based
on sound interpretation of the fourth amendment. 09
Justice Purtle also stated that the majority did not have the power
to abrogate the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure in favor of a
rule which offers less protection to the citizenry."0 He stated that the
court adopted the rules; they apply to all proceedings that come before
the court; and the court must follow the rules until they are changed.
In addition, he stated that it was improper for the court to state what
test should be applied in the future."'
State v. Thompson altered a wealth of Arkansas precedent as to
the proper test to be applied in determining probable cause. The major-
102. 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350.
103. 103 S. Ct. 2317.
104. 280 Ark. at 271, 658 S.W.2d at 352.
105. 280 Ark. at 273, 658 S.W.2d at 353-54.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3.
107. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2325-26.
108. Id.
109. 280 Ark. at 273-74, 658 S.W.2d at 353-54.
110. Id.
III. 280 Ark. 265, 658 S.W.2d 350.
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ity of Arkansas cases followed the Aguilar/Spinelli two-prong test, in
form if not in substance."' The Aguilar test is required by the Arkan-
sas Rules of Criminal Procedure as well." 3 However, the legislature
granted the power to promulgate these rules to the court " 4 and the
court has stated that it has the power to amend these rules. "' Notwith-
standing the power vested in the court to amend the rules, the court
should not have so readily exercised that power. If Rule 13.1(b) is no
longer in effect,116 a magistrate will make a probable cause determina-
tion by analyzing any and all relevant circumstances, rather than inde-
pendently analyzing the basis of the informant's knowledge and his ve-
racity. While the totality of the circumstances test on its surface fits
better with the notion that probable cause is fluid, there must be some
guidelines spelled out for those who are to apply the test. There are no
guidelines in Thompson. The court expressly states that the affidavit
would be sufficient under the Aguilar test, but that the totality test will
be used in the future.' 17 The decision offers no advice on what circum-
stances are to be considered or how they are to be weighted. The only
guideline is an affidavit which would be sufficient under either test. The
decision neglects to inform the reader how the totality test is to be
used, or what its effect is, if any, on Rule 13.1 (b). The decision approx-
imates an advisory opinion." 8
Opponents of the Aguilar/Spinelli two-prong test point to its. ri-
gidity as a fatal drawback. " 9 The criticism centers around a notion
that the Aguilar/Spinelli test precludes the use of common sense."10
However, the test was successfully applied for nearly a decade without
serious repercussions. 1 2 The Gates test is recently formulated, and its
112. See, e.g., State v. Prue, 272 Ark. 221, 614 S.W.2d 221, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 863
(1981), Byars v. State, 259 Ark. 158, 533 S.W.2d 175 (1976); Maxwell v. State, 259 Ark. 86, 531
S.W.2d 468 (1976). But see Baxter v. State, 262 Ark. 303, 556 S.W.2d 428 (1977); Cary v.
State, 269 Ark. 510, 534 S.W.2d 230 (1976); State v. Lechner, 262 Ark. 401, 557 S.W.2d 195
(1977).
113. ARK. R. CRIM. P. 13.1(b).
114. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 22-242 (Supp. 1983).
115. Jennings v. State, 276 Ark. 217, 633 S.W.2d 373, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 862 (1982).
116. The court did not expressly abrogate or amend Rule 13.1(b) in Thompson; rather, the
opinion merely refers to Rule 13.1(b) as mandating the Aguilar test and then states that the
totality of the circumstances test will be applied in the future. 280 Ark. at 271, 658 S.W.2d at
352.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 271-72, 658 S.W.2d at 353 (Purtle, J., concurring).
119. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983); Baxter v. State, 262 Ark. 303, 556
S.W.2d 428 (1977).
120. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2328.
121. See Whiteley, 401 U.S. 560; Harris, 403 U.S. 573.
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problems are unknown. The facts in Gates are not helpful, as there was
a great deal of independent, neutral corroboration before fourth
amendment activity occurred. 122 While the tip was only partially cor-
roborated, it was sufficiently detailed so that self-verification could sat-
isfy the veracity prong of the two-prong test by establishing that the
information was reliable. 123 The Aguilar test required that the veracity
prong be satisfied. However, this prong was satisfied by a showing that
the informant was credible or the information was reliable. 12' Because
the facts in Gates involved self-verification, it is not sufficiently analo-
gous to situations similar to Thompson, where there is no partial cor-
roboration prior to fourth amendment activity. Thus the facts in Gates
do not supply any guidelines for future decisions.
The majority's reading of Gates is that the informant's tip alone
supplied probable cause. 125 This does not take into account the inde-
pendent corroboration that occurred in Gates. Thus there is a very real
risk that, without sufficient guidelines, probable cause could be based
on an anonymous tip alone, without any assurance that the tip is more
than casual rumor or mere suspicion.
The Gates decision acknowledged that state courts misapplied the
holdings in Aguilar and Spinelli by apparently reading the two-prong
test as requiring an elaborate set of guidelines and rules.1 26 The danger
now is that state courts will misread Gates and will not require a true
showing of probable cause. This would lead to the very result that the
fourth amendment sought to prevent. Given the decision in Thompson,
which has a dearth of guidelines and exhibits a woefully inadequate
logical basis, this is a very real risk indeed.
A further risk of the totality test is that, upon review of search
issues of this type, the focus will be on the fruits of the search rather
than the attendant facts which lead to the determination of probable
cause prior to the search. This danger could easily be illustrated by the
Thompson case itself. The court's distaste for the nature of Thompson's
crime is clear. 27 If the affidavit were not forced to meet the stricter
122. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
123. Cf Draper, 358 U.S. 307. In Draper, the informant's tip was corroborated by the agent
as to neutral details before any search or seizure. This self-verification aspect made the tip more
reliable, thus sufficient.
124. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114-15.
125. Thompson, 280 Ark. at 271, 658 S.W.2d at 352. In Gates, the Court specifically stated
that an informant's tip alone would not establish probable cause. 103 S. Ct. at 2326.
126. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2327.
127. Thompson. 280 Ark. at 270, 658 S.W.2d at 352. "The sexual abuse of children is an
abhorrent crime which clearly poses a threat to society." Id.
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standard, it is entirely possible that the courts would allow the nature
of the crime and the fruits of the search to prejudice their decisions as
to probable cause. Because the sufficiency of probable cause, if con-
tested, will always be made after the fact, the test applied should con-
tain guidelines to lessen the reliance on hindsight and the tendency to
let the success of the search color the finding of probable cause.
The fourth amendment clearly mandates that warrants be specific
and based on probable cause. Allowing an unverified informant's tip
alone to justify the violation of a citizen's right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures is the very evil the fourth amendment
sought to prevent. 128 Certainly these anonymous tips are important in
protecting society against crime. They should not, however, be allowed
to support issuance of a search warrant without any independent cor-
roboration. 129 "If the courts become lax and allow unreliable hearsay
statements to constitute the foundation for the issuance of a search
warrant, then . . . [n]o domicile would be safe because a disgruntled
neighbor or former friend could have a search warrant issued for purely
personal reasons."' 130
The fourth amendment should be zealously guarded against even
the most seemingly innocuous infringements of the rights it seeks to
protect. Arkansas should not have so readily departed from a test that
offers its citizenry greater protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The totality test, as adopted here, absent any guidelines or
limitations, is highly susceptible to misapplication; that misapplication
is likely to result in an invasion of fourth amendment rights. Especially
in a time of fear and conflict, these rights must be preserved, for "the
rule we fashion is for the innocent and guilty alike."1 31 The Thompson
decision does not adequately safeguard these rights. In the future the
court should set out guidelines for the application of the totality test, or
abandon it in favor of a return to the Aguilar/Spinelli two-prong test.
Janie Willbanks
128. Thompson, 280 Ark. at 273, 658 S.W.2d at 354 (Purtle, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. Prue, 272 Ark. at 229, 614 S.W.2d at 225.
131. Draper, 358 U.S. at 314 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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